I only happened to notice this as it came up on Twitter, but the government's Localism Bill repeals previous legislation which requires local councils to have a mechanism for online petitions.

Clause 28 of the current version of the Bill says simply:

"Chapter 2 of Part 1 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 (petitions to local authorities) is repealed."

The explanatory notes confirm that the clause "removes the requirements for principal local authorities in England and Wales to make, publish and comply with a scheme for the handling of petitions made to the authority, and to provide a facility for making petitions in electronic form to the authority".

It is interesting that on the one hand the government is removing one consultation mechanism, plausibly in the name of decentralisation given that the 2009 Act seems pretty prescriptive, yet adding a requirement that a petition signed by five per cent of the area's population can force a council-wide referendum.

Anyway, Dave Briggs has a great post today on why local council ePetitions don't seem to have had much impact, and discusses some reasons why it might not be the end of the world if the requirement to host them is repealed.

I'd also recommend his spreadsheet looking at the outcomes from local ePetitions.

The comment on that post by Carl Haggerty is also interesting, and I think chimes with similar thoughts I've previously written about national ePetitions.

 

Have I been wasting my time writing the four previous posts about accountability?

I ask that because while I have suggested that the government's proposals are weakening accountability, that could be less important if there are other mechanisms for service improvement which could replace it.

Wondering if there is something better than accountability feels rather like committing some kind of heresy when the accountability of elected leaders to the public is the cornerstone of modern democracy.

But let's begin with the problem with accountability, which Wikipedia hints at nicely:

"It is often used synonymously with such concepts as responsibility, answerability, blameworthiness, liability, and other terms associated with the expectation of account-giving."

Of course, for an account to be given or blame laid, something must have already happened.

So accountability will always be retrospective, at best offering a chance to change course when problems start becoming evident and at worst completely failing to stop any screw-up.

With hindsight

And this problem (if that is an appropriate word) is mirrored in the issue with which I began this series of posts, open data.

As Paul Clarke noted in an excellent comment he wrote on this post, the release of transparency data "seems largely to be a rear-view picture".

As he says, the release of information about "things under consideration but which haven't yet happened" such as future budgets could have a greater potential impact.

"That would test engagement in a far more meaningful way: would transparency then enable change before the event?"

So the alternative to post-event accountability might come in the form of pre-event engagement.

It is interesting that trends towards co-design or co-production of services don't pitch themselves as an alternative to traditional accountability, but perhaps that is what they can become.

If enough members of the public are involved in deciding on a service or a policy before it is implemented, there should be little that needs holding to account. If the policy fails, then the way to change it is not at the ballot box but through continued engagement with the design of the service.

I did note, somewhat disapprovingly, in a previous post that it is possible to end up in a position where voters should be holding themselves to account.

That previous reference, however, was to the public being logically responsible if they fail to vote out underperforming councils.

But with co-production we are talking about a different situation, where decisions have not been made by representatives but by the public themselves.

It is true, however, that participation could only replace accountability as a key democratic mechanism for ensuring legitimacy if it becomes widespread and systematic.

That is not where we are at the moment, but it is somewhere we could get to.

And that would certainly raise more questions about the nature of democratic accountability.

A loss of theoretical clarity

At the end of this series of posts, it seems like there are many questions and few answers.

It is important to recognise that the precise nature of public sector and democratic accountability has always been ambiguous in practice.

In theory the traditional upwards accountability has been simple, hierarchical and inward-looking within organisations, then structured through ministers and Parliament to the public.

But as we move into a world of more fragmented and devolved services, accountability becomes more complex and diverse, and faces out to service users.

Open data is part of this more complex picture, enabling (it is to be hoped, in time) people to understand and judge those services which they choose to use and over which they have some influence.

But the role of 'armchair auditors' is not yet thought through, and elections by themselves offer a disproportionate means for acting against wasteful spending.

In the past we at least knew what the situation was supposed to be in theory, even if the practice was less clear.

Now even a theoretical understanding of political accountability seems more elusive.

If service design and delivery improves to include more user involvement, however, then the current model of accountability will become less important.

The transition period, however, seems destined to be unclear despite the government's insistence that it wishes to be transparent about its actions so that it can be held to account. While its actions tend to suggest it is sincere in these statements, the practical effects may not be as intended.

 

Having previously looked at ways in which the government's reforms affect the issue of civil service accountability, accountability to 'armchair auditors' and accountability through democratic institutions, this post focuses on ways in which accountability might be reduced by political and institutional changes.

The paradox seems to be that as choice increases, accountability decreases.

Bill Moyes of the Institute for Government has written that "a patient choosing a hospital, or a parent a school, is holding services directly to account in ways that civil servants in Whitehall cannot".

But for citizens to have choice over the services they receive, those services have to some extent to be freed from central control in order to respond to demand and compete against each other.

And in reducing the central control, and in some cases even the central standards, ministerial accountability is reduced.

To be fair, the use of choice mechanisms to create self-sustaining improvements in services is not just the invention of the present government, so the issues it raises are not entirely new.

But nonetheless they certainly add to the complexity of the accountability framework.

Systems and results

What is new, however, is the current government's apparent dislike of specifying particular results and standards it wishes to see delivered.

As Peter Riddell has written:

"[T]he key point is that ministers are being held to account for their handling of reform, not for the results. There is no direct link between the reform plans and the outcome. So ministers and civil servants are not being judged by the success, or failure, of the policies. This is unlike the past when ministers and civil servants were held responsible for outcomes."

It does rather seem in this context as if 'the system' is what is responsible for results. Ministers, civil servants and individual service providers work within the context they have been given.

And if things don't improve, it is hard to pin down exactly who is responsible as no one is held to account for any particular individual outcome.

Indeed, as I've previously noted, if 'innovation' is to be encouraged then the number of failures may actually rise.

But how will it be possible to tell if the failure is a result of innovation within a successful system, or the product of an unsuccessful system?

If ministers are only responsible for hard-to-prove systemic failures, this would suggest a significant decline in accountability even though the logic of the government's position is that there should be greater transparency and accountability to the public.

Smaller state

And then there are other issues that arise from the 'Big Society' agenda.

If civil society is more involved in running and organising local services, how is it held to account?

In many ways such organisations aren't accountable at the moment, and perhaps that will remain the same.

If they take over public services then there is the accountability of, perhaps, a payment-by-results contract.

But if they step in to deliver previously public services as the state retrenches, does that imply a loss of democratic accountability?

It is also worth noting that in recent evidence to a Commons committee, Professor John Stewart of the University of Birmingham argued that the government at various times favours devolution to councils, communities and individuals.

It is possible that these different levels could be in conflict with each other, and responsibility can become blurred. And if the responsibility is not clear then the accountability would be reduced in parallel.

However, does this apparent decline in accountability matter? That will be the subject of the fifth and final post in this series tomorrow.

 

In the previous two posts in this series about open data and the changing nature of political accountability, I looked at internal civil service accountability mechanisms and the concept of 'armchair auditors' monitoring government spending.

Both these mechanisms are designed to deliver some improvements in the day-to-day running of the public sector through greater transparency (although my posts are rather sceptical about that), but ultimately ministers suggest that voters should exercise their influence through the ballot box.

To quote communities secretary Eric Pickles:

"In future, the emphasis needs to be on local authorities being democratically accountable to local people rather than to central bureaucratic systems. That is why I am encouraging local authorities wherever possible to make their performance data accessible to their citizens."

The suggestion is that if waste and errors are revealed by open data and not explained or stopped by politicians and officials then it is eventually down to the public to vote for an alternative administration.

This democratic accountability is presumably intended to apply at a national as well as local level.

Data for whom?

The first difficulty here is that, as Professor John Stewart of the University of Birmingham noted in a recent evidence session with the Commons communities and local government committee, statistics and data tend to be "a political tool and a management tool".

The public will cast their votes on the basis of their experience of how good services actually are, he suggested. So as long as services are of a reasonable quality, money wasted on fruitless projects might make no difference.

And second, this kind of democratic accountability is not just about bureaucratic competence and waste.

Indeed unless the waste is on an heroically incompetent scale then it might be that voting for a change of control of the local or national government is a disproportionate response.

Moderate or average incompetence is just one factor among many to be considered when marking an X in the ballot box.

Other factors involved in democratic accountability range from ideological preferences and quality of local candidates to national events or street-level planning decisions.

And then we might consider how possible it is to actually vote in a new administration. Perhaps open data implies a need for some kind of electoral reform which makes it easier to change administrations. Or perhaps it makes the case for the clearer accountability of first-past-the-post.

That is a whole other argument, but I think it is relevant given the specific emphasis on democratic accountability.

Parliamentary accountability

As well as taking place through the ballot box, at the national level at least democratic accountability can also take place through Parliament and its various scrutiny mechanisms.

Many of the emerging issues here are discussed in greater depth in this excellent Institute for Government (IfG) paper.

Deputy prime minister Nick Clegg has acknowledged that parliamentary accountability will become an increasingly imperfect mechanism as the government implements its reforms.

"Ministers standing at the despatch box will continue to be held responsible for local decisions over which they no longer have any control. This will feel uncomfortable, to say the least: responsibility without power, the curse of the decentralising minister. Fear of this scenario has been an obstacle to decentralisation in the past. But we know it is coming, and we are ready to stay the course."

But this is not really just about ministers feeling uncomfortable, it is about a systemic mismatch of power and accountability at the centre of the political system.

Responsibility for not just the running of local services but also the service standards themselves is shifted away from ministers, yet they are accountable to MPs who are there to represent their constituents.

As Bill Moyes wrote in a post for the IfG, the key assumptions about ministerial responsibility at the heart of the way Parliament works are "already not valid for every department and public service" and this is going to become steadily less true over the coming years.

So is the role of an MP to change so that it mirrors that of a minister, focused only on systems? I can't see constituents accepting that as a response from their local representative.

(Although I think one of the main reasons MPs are overburdened with constituency casework is that public services are not as good as they should be at complaints handling, which leaves users who experience problems with little choice but to circumvent the bureaucratic process by exerting political pressure. So perhaps more innovative, responsive and devolved services will have an impact on the proportion of work MPs spend on such casework.)

Or perhaps MPs will need to extend their contacts with local service providers, and these providers will develop some kind of formal accountability to MPs.

Cut out the middle man

But it goes further than that. Prime minister David Cameron said of departmental business plans:

"Instead of bureaucratic accountability to the government machine, these Business Plans bring in a new system of democratic accountability – accountability to the people."

Which sounds rather like the government seeing itself as directly accountable to the public, rather than to them through Parliament.

All governments seek to make their case to the public, of course. But this seems to go a step further in not just engaging or consulting the public but specifically being held to account between elections by an entirely new mechanism which is enabled by a combination of open data and transparency.

To use Cameron's term, it really is a "new system" his government is developing.

It's a theme of this blog that eDemocracy tools have the potential to weaken the role of Parliament as government, officials and public services become more accountable directly to the public.

This seems to be a step along that road.

But while it is an enhancement in accountability in many ways, the same reform agenda also weakens accountability in other ways. This will be the subject of tomorrow's post.

© 2012 eDemocracyBlog.com Suffusion theme by Sayontan Sinha