Utopias and etopias
It is worth noting some of the broader philosophical and social implications of enhancing participation through the internet.
In his paper, Mendez (2007) notes the arguments of Friedrich von Hayek and Sir Karl Popper against the "dangers and futility of utopian forms of social engineering" can be applied to "contemporary e-topias" [i].
Mendez suggests there are three themes to their work which may be applicable in this area.
First, he notes the argument that large-scale claims about social change are not only futile but tend to be wrongly based on scientific theories which don't apply to human interaction, and should therefore be treated with scepticism.
Second, any feasible social experimentation to learn about cause and effect would have to take place on a small scale. But as society doesn't work like a laboratory experiment there will be a huge number of potential variables and close attention should be paid to the unintended consequences of reform.
And third, the focus for examining social change should be on the strategies pursued by individuals as 'political entrepreneurs' rather than on unseen technological forces which may act upon them.
Mendez also highlights Popper's suggestion that "you cannot introduce a political reform without strengthening the opposing forces, to a degree roughly in ratio to the scope of the reform" [ii].
So e-government and e-democracy reforms, given their potential to upset the status quo not just in terms of political processes but also in electoral outcomes, resource allocation and policy delivery and the associated bureaucratic structures "will not necessarily be perceived as politically neutral" [iii].
This suggests that the large-scale change suggested in these essays could be expected to generate an equally big opposing reaction.
However, if this rule was absolute then there would never be any significant political change, as reform would only come through continual small-scale tinkering. But a quick glance at the history books reveals that times of crisis can produce revolutionary change.
And as set out in Section I, in this case the recognition of the need for major change is likely to be generated by the political crisis that will develop as support for traditional governing parties falls substantially. It does not mean, however, that there is no scope for unintended consequences.
At a time of such change, the scope for adverse outcomes is significant, but it is straight forward to imagine transition safeguards which limit the degree of sudden major change which is possible, phasing such reforms in over a period of time and allowing citizens and delivery agencies time to adjust. In effect, this would mean that major reform is achieved through a series of small steps which can be calibrated as the process continues.
Mendez also notes a further point of relevance to these essays; that there is a distinction to be made between academic work on the impact of e-democracy and the practical changes that are currently being implemented.
"This brings us to a neat paradox: while practitioners appear to be engaged in piecemeal political engineering, academic theorists have resorted to ever new conceptualisations of the linkage between ICT and social change. Indeed, there is no shortage of academic theoretical musings on the impact of ICTs on democratic process that comes perilously close to the utopian forms of social engineering that Hayek and Popper castigated. Much of this, it could be argued, takes the following simplistic form: the quantitative increase in the use of ICTs in the political realm is producing qualitative shifts in the political process. Although hard evidence of such effects may be hard to come by, theoreticians can still take misguided comfort in believing themselves to be endowed with the foresight of being able to detect the hidden forces at play that, given sufficient time, will generate the hypothesised societal change." [iv]
One response to this argument might be ouch! although another is that the case for change set out here genuinely is a qualitative change in the nature of the political system, and is certainly not just tinkering around the edges.
Equally, the case here is that while these are major changes to the political system, they work in tandem with changes already taking place. This leads on to another of Mendez's points:
"Contrary to the large-scale prognostications of the social and political transformation theorists, the empirical reality appears to be closer to the Popperian ideal of 'piecemeal social engineering'. In other words, in terms of real world e-democratic experimentation, much of it is proceeding in small steps, with trials here and there, or through the emergence of spontaneous and usually small scale experimentation on the part of civil society organisations. Evidence of 'big bang' type transformations in the political process are far from evident. This in itself does not refute the transformative change theorists since their claims, it could be argued, are predicated on the hypothesised cumulative impact of small scale experimentation. This, of course, brings us neatly back to the argument about how increasing quantitative change in the use of ICT leads to qualitative shifts in social organisation over time. In fact, most theorists conveniently camouflage the logic of their argument with this type of conceptual mask. Nonetheless, although the actual causal mechanism is perhaps more modestly formulated, the bold claim remains the same. Part of the Hayekian and Popperian intellectual critique of this type of social theory was directed at unfolding its flawed logic. In a nutshell, it amounts to this: only a super-mind, one possessed with a correct model of all the possible interactions between myriad individuals, across distinct contextual settings, and with complete information on the effects produced by such interactions, could correctly forecast social trajectories. Such a human mind, or body of theory, simply does not exist. Because of such informational constraints it is, therefore, much better to limit our focus to the more modest investigation of Popperian 'piecemeal social engineering'."[v]
This is an interesting point, and it is worth noting that the causal mechanism in these essays is the effect of the long tail on political parties.
The proposals for change set out here ultimately represent a political choice, one that can be made or not made. Rather than seeking to provide a complete theory of societal interaction, they represent an alternative political system which seeks to achieve a specific end, which is ensuring the continued legitimacy of the state.
A further point to note is that Popper was critical of 'historicism', the theory that there are given trends in human affairs which lead towards a particular end. In his defence of the 'open society' he argued that such views gave too much support for authoritarianism and totalitarianism, threatening individual liberty.
But the ideas set out here fall midway between these two sides. On one hand, they do imply a degree of historical inevitability, perhaps technological determinism, in the suggestion that cultural changes brought about by the internet will change the conduct and structures of politics in its broadest sense.
However, the intended outcome is the opposite of any form of authoritarianism. Not only does it preclude the possibility of any form of dictatorship, but it also goes a long way to reducing the ability of any central government to impose any policies on anyone.
By providing the individual citizen with far more choice, it will, perhaps paradoxically in Popper's terms, therefore contribute to the maintenance of a free and open society.
Footnotes:
[ii] Popper, K. (1957), 'The poverty of historicism', Routlege, London, UK, p. 57. Quoted in Mendez, F. (2007) p. 4.
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